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Protecting	informal	workers	in	India:	the	need	for	a
universal	job	guarantee
The	COVID-19	lockdown	implemented	in	India	is	estimated	to	have	tripled	the	urban	unemployment	rate.	Most	low-
income	urban	workers	will	fall	through	the	cracks	of	the	provisions	being	put	in	place	to	support	workers,	and
almost	none	of	them	has	access	to	benefits.	Swati	Dhingra	(LSE)	argues	that	the	self-targeting	features	of	a
universal	job	guarantee	make	it	an	appealing	policy	option	to	protect	informal	workers	in	urban	India	both	now	and
in	the	longer	term.
The	lockdown	in	India	due	to	the	COVID-19	pandemic	is	estimated	to	have	tripled	the	urban	unemployment	rate
within	three	weeks.	A	full	bounce	back	and	business	sentiment	has	shifted	from	negative	to	one	of	stark	pessimism,
according	to	the	Reserve	Bank	of	India.	The	government’s	seemingly	bold	economic	package	does	little	for	workers
in	urban	areas.
A	sanitation	worker	in	Delhi.	Photo:	Sharada	Prasad	CS	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
The	vast	majority	of	people	working	in	urban	areas	are	employed	informally.	They	have	no	written	job	contracts,	no
regular	salaried	work,	and	are	often	employed	casually	through	job	contractors,	subcontractors	and	temp	agencies.
Several	attempts	to	formalise	informal	work	have	been	made	and	are	underway.	But	the	reality	on	the	ground	is
that	the	majority	of	urban	workers	–	62-85%	of	them	–	have	no	access	to	benefits,	which	make	up	the	flagship
schemes	for	COVID-19	relief	to	workers	in	urban	areas.
Among	urban	workers	who	are	in	private	casual	work,	over	80%	are	in	establishments	that	are	typically	not	even
enrolled	in	social	security	programmes	like	employees’	provident	and	state	insurance	funds,	which	are	being	used
to	provide	relief	to	workers	during	the	lockdown.	The	organised	sector	in	India	is	required	to	provide	benefits	to
many	of	the	workers	that	they	employ	informally.	But	most	low-income	urban	workers	fall	through	the	cracks	of
these	provisions	and	almost	none	of	them	have	access	to	benefits.
Policies	to	protect	workers	are	being	discussed	across	the	world.	These	include	immediate	measures,	like
the	United	Kingdom’s	payment	of	80%	of	wages	for	furloughed	workers	who	are	being	kept	on	by	their
employers	and	longer-term	measures	like	a	universal	basic	income,	which	has	been	gathering	support	from	a
number	of	academics	and	political	figures.	Many	of	these	ideas	have	emerged	from	developed	countries	that	have
substantial	state	capacity	and	well-developed	tax	and	benefits	infrastructure	in	place	to	carry	out	plans	broadly,
quickly	and	over	a	sustained	period	of	time.
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In	developing	economies	like	India,	overcoming	an	economic	crisis	is	important	for	saving	lives	because	economic
insecurity	is	fundamental	to	the	overall	wellbeing	of	vulnerable	groups.	India’s	premier	business	association,	the
Confederation	of	Indian	Industries	(CII),	has	already	urged	the	national	government	to	provide	a	fiscal	stimulus
of	Rs.2	trillion,	which	could	support	200	million	low-income	people	with	Rs.10,000	each.
A	common	feature	of	the	majority	of	economic	proposals	being	put	forward	is	an	insistence	on	targeted	direct
transfers	to	individuals,	often	administered	through	biometric	identification-based	bank	accounts.	In	fact,	the	CII
specifically	mentions	an	“Aadhar-based	Direct	Benefit	Transfer”.	Restricting	the	discussion	on	longer-term
measures	to	targeted	direct	bank	transfers	is	unwarranted	and	hardly	based	on	evidence.	Encashing	checks	or
targeting	based	on	incomes	may	be	relatively	easy	in	developed	economies	like	the	US	and	the	UK.	But	for
vulnerable	groups	in	India,	access	to	banks	(especially	in	the	near	future)	and	correct	targeting	of	benefits	are	a
perennial	problem.
Targeting	based	on	incomes	sounds	straightforward,	but	it	requires	governments	to	have	deep	knowledge	of	who	is
poor	and	vulnerable	and	an	infrastructure	to	reach	them	on	time.	But	detailed	data	are	lacking.	For	example,	just
7%	of	adults	file	taxes	and	available	labour	force	statistics	make	it	difficult	to	identify	unemployed	individuals
accurately.	There	is	now	growing	evidence	of	exclusions	and	omissions,	and	payment	failures	and	misdirection	that
have	resulted	from	the	existing	targeted	direct	bank	transfer	system.	These	failings	have	created	severe	hardship
for	vulnerable	groups,	even	in	normal	times	and	in	places	where	the	system	has	been	in	place	for	a	while	(Dreze	et
al.	2017).
In	this	context,	the	self-targeting	nature	of	a	job	guarantee	programme	makes	it	an	appealing	longer-term	policy
option	to	address	the	looming	economic	crisis	and	its	impacts	on	those	in	precarious	work.	As	early	as	1989,
inspired	by	job	schemes	in	California,	India	and	England,	Besley	and	Coate	(1992)	favoured	work	over	welfare
payments	for	two	reasons	that	are	particularly	relevant	for	urban	India.
Workfare	schemes,	like	job	guarantees,	are	self-targeting.	A	needy	rural	household	and	a	rural	landlord	both	have
access	to	work	under	India’s	National	Rural	Employment	Guarantee	Act	(NREGA),	but	the	landlord	is	rarely	going
to	take	up	digging	wells	for	Rs.202	a	day.	A	job	guarantee	minimises	the	targeting	problem	of	who	applies	for
income	support.	It	gives	needy	households	livelihood	security	during	bad	times.	A	second	reason	is	that	job
programmes	help	people	develop	work	skills	and	public	goods,	which	sustain	further	growth.
These	reasons	motivated	India’s	NREGA	to	cover	all	rural	households	and	the	government	expects	to	rely	on	it	to
create	rural	jobs	once	social	distancing	rules	are	relaxed.	It	is	time	to	be	bolder	than	this.	A	universal	job	guarantee
needs	to	be	on	the	table	for	discussion	to	cover	the	many	workers	who	are	in	precarious	work	everywhere	in	the
country.
Unfortunately,	the	track	record	of	recent	economic	events,	like	demonetisation,	implementation	of	the	Goods	and
Services	Tax	and	now	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	have	shown	that	vulnerable	groups	remain	hard	to	reach.
Information	and	infrastructure	in	India	have	not	changed	radically	enough	to	warrant	the	complacency	that	direct
transfers	to	specific	households	will	take	care	of	their	economic	insecurity.	Early	arguments	for	the	value	of	a	job
guarantee	are	still	relevant.
To	understand	whether	job	guarantees	are	valued	by	workers,	the	Centre	for	Economic	Performance	(CEP)	at	the
London	School	of	Economics	conducted	a	large-scale	survey	of	over	16,000	individuals	in	India	during	2018
(Dhingra	and	Machin	2020).
National	statistics,	even	in	more	advanced	countries,	have	proven	inadequate	in	recording	informal	workers,
especially	the	new	breed	of	self-employed	and	temporary	workers	who	have	arisen	in	cities	outside	of	the
organised	sector.	Many	of	these	informal	workers	have	a	portfolio	of	short-lived,	temporary	and	seasonal	jobs	that
go	unrecorded	in	national	surveys.
A	key	finding	of	the	CEP	survey	is	that,	on	average,	an	urban	worker	is	willing	to	take	a	15%	wage	cut	to	get	a
guaranteed	number	of	days	of	work	in	the	year.	(NREGA	takes	the	form	of	a	100	days	of	guaranteed	work	for	rural
households).
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Another	finding	from	the	survey	is	sobering	in	the	light	of	the	plight	of	migrants	since	the	lockdown.	Migrants	in	our
survey	–	those	living	in	a	state	other	than	their	state	of	birth	or	commuting	in	from	villages	and	towns	into	cities	–
were	much	less	likely	than	non-migrants	to	be	able	to	pay	for	emergency	expenses.	They	also	placed	a	greater
value	on	having	a	job	guarantee.
Most	migrants	in	India	are	not	eligible	for	targeted	programmes	outside	of	their	home	regions.	Although	a	universal
programme	would	not	have	overcome	the	immediate	plight	of	these	uncovered	migrants,	it	is	certainly	fair	to	say
that	the	shortcomings	of	targeted	programmes	and	the	safety	net	holes	they	create	have	not	been	adequately
weighed	in	the	policy	discussion.
The	self-targeting	feature	of	job	guarantees	makes	them	equitable	and	cost-effective.	A	100-day	job	guarantee	at	a
daily	wage	of	Rs.200	(similar	to	what’s	been	announced	for	NREGA)	would	cost	Rs.20,000	per	person.
Let’s	suppose	all	casual	workers	(13%	of	the	urban	workforce	of	300	million	persons),	irrespective	of	income,	take
up	the	job	guarantee.	To	calculate	how	many	other	individuals	take	it	up,	add	the	15%	value	that	workers	place	on
having	a	job	guarantee	and	we	end	up	with	a	daily	value	of	Rs.230.	In	urban	India,	16%	of	the	workforce,	including
those	who	are	unemployed,	earn	less	than	Rs.230	from	other	work	and	suppose	all	of	them	take	up	a	job
guarantee.	From	a	back	of	the	envelope	calculation,	an	urban	job	guarantee	would	cost	Rs.1.74	trillion,	or	0.8%	of
India’s	annual	GDP.	This	is	easily	within	the	reach	of	a	nation	aspiring	to	a	$5	trillion	economy.
Of	course,	many	including	the	government’s	expert	panel	on	minimum	wages,	would	think	Rs.200	is	obscenely	low.
At	Rs.400	a	day,	the	estimated	cost	of	providing	a	100-day	job	guarantee	would	be	Rs.6.6	trillion.	The	take-up	rates
assumed	here	are	very	high	to	provide	upper	limit	estimates.	In	reality,	costs	are	likely	to	be	much	lower,	because
the	take-up	rates	here	include	government	workers	and	business	owners,	who	place	much	lower	values	on	a	job
guarantee.	Importantly,	these	costs	do	not	net	out	potential	benefits	from	skills	for	young	urban	workers,	93%	of
who	have	no	formal	vocational	or	on-the	job	training.	A	job	guarantee	might	lift	some	of	their	despondency,	as
documented	for	young	UK	workers	during	the	New	Deals	of	the	late	1990s	(Layard	2001).
As	a	pioneer	of	the	world’s	largest	jobs	programme,	India	has	chosen	to	undermine	its	appeal	even	though
evidence	is	already	suggesting	increases	in	labour	attendance	since	opening	up	of	NREGA	works.	At	a	time	of
severe	economic	insecurity,	a	pledge,	not	even	an	actual	outlay,	of	1-3%	of	GDP	is	a	minuscule	sum	to	restore	a
life	of	dignity	to	those	who	have	often	fallen	through	the	cracks	of	the	nation’s	safety	nets.
This	is	not	the	time	for	self-professed	‘technophiles’	to	cling	dogmatically	to	the	libertarian	ambitions	of	targeted
biometrically-linked	transfers	as	an	end	in	itself.	Old	ideas	of	job	guarantees	have	value	in	today’s	difficult	economic
times.
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Author’s	note
The	figures	cited	here	are	based	on	data	from	the	Periodic	Labour	Force	Survey	2017-18	and	a	new	CEP	survey	of
informal	workers	in	India,	which	was	conducted	in	2018	(Dhingra	and	Machin	2020).
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
Vox.EU.
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